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Innovation and Economic Development: Theoretical Retrospect and Prospect 
L Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss some theoretical issues latent 
in the basic ideas behind the LDB-ECLA research program in science and 
technologys and now being sharpened by the empirical findings that are emerg-
ing. The program presumes that manufacturing development in countries 
that are not technological leaders may involve significant elements of 
creativity and innovation. The empirical studies are finding this to be 
so. The technologies employed in Latin American manufacturing plants 
tend to be somewhat idiosyncratic and not easily describable as merely 
backwards. Further, technologies employed differ significantly among 
firms within the same country. Innovation, idiosyncrscy, and diversity, 
are not characteristics of manufacturing development highlighted by most 
formal development models, and indeed these characteristics are hard to 
reconcile with orthodox formal theory. Yet there they are, certainly 
interesting and probably important features of the development landscape. 
What is it in prevailing orthodox theory that makes the empirical 
findings of this project seem heterodox? What kind of theoretical reform-
ulation is necessary to square with "the empirical facts that have been 
found? How can the concepts be formalized? What insights into the nature 
of effective development strategies are provided by a modified theoretical 
structure? There are the questions probed in this essay. 
-2-
II. Technological Progress and Technological Backwardness in the 
Neoclassical Model 
It seems useful to begin the discussion by stressing that contemporary 
formal neoclassical theory was not designed to deal with development type 
phenomena and problems, and that its implementation for these purposes has 
involved some ingenious but somewhat ad hoc add ons to the basic model. 
The question I want ultimately to explore is the adequacy of these add 
ons. 
One of the consequences of the neoclassical synthesis and the focus 
on steady states that marked the main line of economic theorizing around 
the turn of the century was that attention turned away from one of the 
central concerns of classical economics - economic development. When in 
the early post-war era the attention of economists again turned to economic 
development much of the older classical wisdom had been forgotten. The 
theorizing about productivity was rested on the static neoclassical 
formulation of firm behavior that was used in contemporary price theory. 
But the neoclassical kit of concepts and perceptions lacked one idea that 
was prominent in the classical tradition: that innovation is an extremely 
important part of economic activity. And as a result the earlier attempts 
to analyze development within a neoclassical framework floundered. 
The key presumption of the early post-war research was that changes 
« 
over time in the output of a nation could be explained as movements along 
a production function, and differences in output at any time among nations 
could be explained as representing different points along a (common) pro-
duction function. During the fifties a number of studies showed that only 
a small portion of growth (of output per worker) in countries could be 
explained by movements along a production function (increases in capital 
and other resources per worker). At roughly the same time economists, 
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to comprehend that differences in resouces (capital-) per worker could explain 
only a small fraction of the observed productivity differences among nations. 
If one preserves the production function language then clearly growth had 
to be understood largely in terms of shifts in production functions, and 
differences between rich and poor nations in terms of different levels of 
production functions. 
Technological advance then became an important phrase in the 
vocabulary of growth and development theory. In high income countries 
this technological advance was viewed as the pushing forward of the frontiers 
of best practice. In less developed countries it was viewed as diffusion 
or (among engineers and natural scientists) technology transfer - the 
adoption of techniques that had been employed for some time in the more 
developed countries. One of the major functions of this IBD - ECLA 
project is to question the sharpness of this distinction. Anticipating, 
a®d exagerating, conclusions, for the present I will talk of both kinds 
of shifts as innovation. During the late 1960s and into the 70s a consider-
able amount of attention began was paid to theorizing about innovation. There 
are three recognizable strands. 
One of these, which might be called the simple neoclassical extension, 
views a firm as not merely choosing inputs and outputs within a given 
production set, but as choosing a production set. In the simpliest versions, 
among the choices to be made on the basis of a profit maximizing calculus 
are various possible improvements in'the production function (often char-
acterized in terms of factor augmentations) that can be bought for different 
outlays of resources. For a firm at the frontiers of technology it is 
natural to call these outlays research and development. While to my 
knowledge this model has not been applied to firms not at the frontiers, 
it might be applied by considering investments in learning about and gaining 
access to the technologies used by other firms. As in the traditional 
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the process by which technological advance occurs, at least they specify a 
process - like doing R and D or engaging in technology transfer activities 
- that one can observe and describe. While in some of the verbal descriptions 
of learning there is some discussion of what is going on (see Hirsch for 
example)in the formal treatments there tends to be no discussion of what 
is learned by whom and how; there is no characterization of process. The 
learning by doing models must be recognized as logically incomplete. 
As my discussion above has indicated, the phenomenon of a firm learning 
to do (something like) what other firnshave been doing has been not carefully 
considered in any of the traditions concerned with innovation. I have 
suggested ways in which it could be treated as an investment in learning 
what others are doing, or as a special kind of search. But these char-
acteriztions of the process, as their analogue characterizations of the 
creation or discovery of new technology, do not come to grips with the 
groping uncertain nature of the technology transfer process and with the 
obvious fact that a mix of special transfer activities and learning by 
doing is involved. 
I believe that a serious model of innovation must admit uncertainty 
in a way more fundamental than contained within the contemporary search 
models, and must recognize a range of interacting activities that contribute 
to innovation including specially directed ones like research and development 
and others connected with operating experience. Obviously I need now to 
support and elaborate these propositions. Let me do so by exploring how 
and why the neoclassical formalism evades them. 
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III. Implicit Assumptions Behind the Orthodox Models 
Jt is useful to look both at the surface structure of these models, and 
at some implicit assumptions that seem to lie behind the surface structure. 
On the surface, these models (excepting the learning by doing models which 
seem logically incomplete) almost invariably have three major components. 
The first is a sharply defined production set which characterizes what a 
firm can do at any time. The second is an "industry" production set which 
contains the existing sets of all the firms in the industry and which is 
viewed as depicting all the points that are in some sense or other accessible 
to any firm at that time through "technology transfer". Finally there is 
an invention possibility set which extends beyond the prevailing industry 
production set and includes all the points that are achievable through 
research and development; research and development outcomes within this 
set may be regarded as stochastic (with known distribution) or determinate. 
These components have proved analytically convenient for modeling. It well 
may be, however, that models based on them tend to obscure, and are incapable 
of illuminating, certain important features of the economic development 
process. 
While in most models these components simply are assumed with little 
or no discussion to justify them, I propose that behind the scenes is a set 
of deeper notions, occasionally explicit but almost always implicit, that 
economists hold about production capabilities, technology transfer, and 
« 
invention. The key organizing idea is that there is something called 
"technology" which lies behind each of these sets -- the smaller set 
technology "known" to a firm, the middle size set technology "known" to 
the industry, the larger set technology "known to be achievable" by 
engineers and scientists. Technology is regarded as being describable 
by a set of blue prints, or a recipe, or a set of instructions, which if 
followed precisely, will lead to a specified result. In the earlier post-
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war literature, the blueprints implicitly were assumed to be contained within 
a giant library, accessable to all. Subtly the idea of access changed, and 
property rights and private libraries became the metaphors. Thus a firm at 
any time is viewed as possessing and being able to work with a particular 
set of blueprints (instructions) that in general do not include all the 
known (by somebody) blueprints. A firm (or engineer) who possesses a 
particular blueprint is viewed as being able to give or sell that blueprint 
(perhaps along with other kinds of instruction) to another firm who then 
possesses and can use the technology. Scientists and engineers are viewed 
as being able to visualize quite precisely blueprints and instructions not 
yet drawn up, and as being able to prepare and make available these blueprints 
through an activity called research and development. At a still more abstract 
level of description, technology is viewed as explicit and articulated, 
imitable and teachable, and imbedded in a broaded body of understanding which 
permits previously unused variants to be reliably readied for use. 
I maintain that if not exactly these, closely equivalent assumptions are 
needed if one were to deduce or justify the way the major components of 
orthodox models are specified. But surely there is a considerable tacit 
element in what is required to operate many technologies, particularly if 
a considerable division of labor and a command and control system are involved 
in their undertaking. A firm will not be able to know with certainty all the 
things it can do, and certainly will not be able to articulate explicitly how 
it does what it does. For this reason and others,the technologies operated 
successfully by one firm may not be easily imitated or taught. And the result 
of a"technology transfer" process is likely to be a set of procedures that 
differs in certain important respects from the template. In many technologies 
there is little understanding of why certain things work and others not, and 
hence considerable vagueness regarding what new techniques can be developed 
easily. These uncertainties often are not resolvable fully in the laboratory 
or pilot plant but require actual operating experience. Even if they are 
resolvable in a laboratory, teaching and learning problems may require that 
learning by doing supplement learning by experiment and engineering 
design efforts. 
To the extent technologies are tacit, firm production sets are fuzzy 
around the edges. To the extent that imitation is not trivial, the idea 
of an industry wide production set the elements of which are accessable 
to all firms is a misleading abstraction. To the extent that technologies 
are not well understood, sharply defined invention possibility sets are 
a misleading concept and interaction between learning through R and 0 and 
learning through experience is an essential part of the invention process. 
These aspects - tacitness, inimitability, and low level of understanding 
clearly are not orthogonal but well may go together. I have used the term 
"tacit" to refer to uncertainty regarding the range of available techniques 
for production, and "low understanding" to indicate lack of a reliable R 
and D activity; the phenomena here are very close and not readily separable 
in practice. Difficulties in imitation can stem from lack of explicitness 
about what is being imitated or lack of understanding to enable the imitator 
and teacher to distinguish essential from inessential elements; these aspects 
sound different but may be close to the same thing. However, I propose that 
for modeling purposes it is useful to think of three different dimensions 
in characterizing particular technologies -- explicitness, imitability, 
degree of understanding. The neoclassical innovation model can be 
viewed as a special case in which polar assumptions are made about all 
of these variables. I would propose that for some technologies and for 
some problems, these polar extreme assumptions may be a convenient 
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first approximation, but for other technologies and inquiries it is 
extremely important to pay attention to tacitness, inimitability, 
weakness of understanding. 
For example (while the studies coming out of this project are rocking me 
even regarding this) I would have presumed that certain chemical process 
technologies, mostly wrapped up and embodied in particular pieces of equip-
ment, could safely be regarded as explicit (in the sense that one could 
specify accurately the program for running the plant), imitable and teachable 
(the technology transfer metaphor ought to work here) and embedded in a 
strong enough body of general understanding so that certain redesigns and 
modifications could be attempted with some confidence of success. In con-
trast, various crafts clearly are not characterized by an explicit and 
articulated technology; indeed each piece of a craft output is likely to 
be in some ways unique. Crafts are imitable and teachable only in, a very 
broad sense involving a considerable amount of apprenticeship resulting in 
a skill by the learner that differs in essential respects from that of the 
teacher. And one of the reasons for the lack of significant innovation in 
many craft technologies is that understanding is so weak that the batting 
average for attempted modifications from prevailing custom is very low. 
Consider the implications for thinking about the process of manufacturing 
development in less developed countries of recognizing a considerable element 
of tacitness regarding a firm's prevailing capabilities, considerable 
difficulty in imitating what another firm is doing and with technical transfer 
moré generally, and limited understanding of why things work the way they do 
* 
and what would happen if something else were tried. One would expect to find 
exactly what the empirical studies in this project are finding. Idiosyncratic 
firms, differing significantly among themselves in capabilities, even when 
evolving under roughly the same economic conditions. Nervousness on the part 
of firms about departing too far from their established practices. A blend 
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of attempts to learn from other firms and engineers, to do engineering design 
studies (research and development),and learning by. doing, in augmenting 
capabilities. 
I have not yet mentioned an obviously important factor beihind difficulties 
of technology transfers, and a key source of the idiosyncrasies o f technologies 
used by certain firms in certain countries - unavailability of certain 
particular inputs or local conditions that make it impossible, 
not merely uneconomic, to employ a technology used successfully elsewhere. 
I have not because I suspect that this aspect of the problem may easily 
be overweighted in quick simple explanations of the phenomena in question, 
and thus initial attention to it may deter looking further to see the kinds 
of factors I have discussed above. Further, I propose that to a considerable 
extent the idiosyncratic inputs and special requirements problem may be the 
result of the idiosyncratic technology phenomena as much as a cause. Cer-
tainly there can be peculiarities of locally available raw materials. But 
consider the courses of idiosyncracies of locally manufactured intermediate 
inputs - one would suspect idiosyncratic technologies employed would be at 
least as important as peculiar local raw materials. And to what extent are 
particularities of the local market that require special designs of product 
related to particularities of complimentary products or systems that employ 
the product as an input? I don't know, but I suspect that there are a 
number of cases where this is important. For example, the inability to 
adequately maintain roads calls for cars with especially durable axles. 
a 
Whatever the chicken and whatever the egg, there clearly are 
fascinating dynamics involved in a system where technologies are somewhat 
tacit, difficult to imitate precisely, and require learning by doing as 
well as by R and D. There is firm specific as well as industry and technology 
general knowledge- Productdifferentiation may emerge as a result of that, at 
least initially, rather than being the result of any carefully thought through 
marketing strategy. In a competitive environment selection pressures would 
be excerted to weed out firms with high cost technologies and inferior 
products. Responses to these pressures,even by an alert active management, 
would not inevitably be successful if technology transfer and R and D both 
were not particularly reliable activities. In less competitive environments 
one would not be startled to see certain very idiosyncratic and uneconomic 
enterprises continuing to survive. 
I suspect that there is at once a considerable amount of agreement among 
scholars of the manufacturing development process regarding this characterizati 
together with considerable nervousness that what I have been describing must 
be regarded as empirical complexities and not as elements for theoretical 
reasoning. I think the concern is misplaced. Economists have got so used 
to theoretical formalism based on well defined firm and industry production 
sets and invention possibility sets that the proposal to back off from these 
is seen as anti-theoretical. This is not so. I am pointing to a problem in 
a particular theoretical formulation, not in theorizing in general. 
I will not argue that the theoretical reconstruction I propose will be 
easy. But I maintain that there are a number of building blocks around for 
beginning the attempts at reconstruction. 
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IV. How Might The Ideas Be Formalized? 
I propose that there are two roughly separable problems here. One is 
the formalization of the ideas at the microscopic level of the individual 
firms innovation, or case history. The other is formalization that enables 
one to analyze behavior at the level of the sector or economy. Let me deal 
with this latter aspect first. I think that the models being developed 
jointly by Sidney Winter and myself provide some strong clues as to how some 
of these ideas might be formalized at the level of aialysis of an industry 
or sector. Indeed these models already have build into them in a stylized 
abstract way a number of a necessary features. 
The models presume that at any moment of time firms have only a limited 
range of techniques among which they can choose reliably. The models contain 
two different kinds of search activities, one directed toward exploring 
theoretical possibilities (one can think of this as R. and D), the other 
focusing on what other firms are doing. The outcome of these search activities 
are stochastic and not predictable in advance in any detail. The firms compete 
with each other in a market, some do well and grow and others do badly and 
decline. The overall model provides a vehicle for exploring at the level of 
the industry or the economy the implications, in terms of a time series of 
variables like output, inputs, and prices, of such a collection of idio-
syncratic, groping, and competing firms. 
The explicitness, imitability, and degree of understanding associated 
with a technology can be interpreted within these models in quite natural 
ways. In the earlier discussion, explicitness was associated with the 
presence of a set of blueprints which a firm could follow reliably so as 
to be able to do things significantly different from what it presently is 
doing. In most of the specific models we have run, we have assumed that at 
any time a firm only knows one technique - in the language coined above this 
is an extreme assumption about "implicitness". But, as a monotonic function 
of explicitness, that set might be augmented to include technologies that the 
firm has used in the recent past, some that it never has used, and some that 
no firm has ever used. (The latter situation would correspond to the full 
blown available production set assumption of contemporary orthodoxy.) 
It pays to dwell a moment on theoretical issues relating to a firm's 
production set, and connections between today's production set and yesterday's 
R and D (or other forms of learning). Main line price theory evades the 
issues by never asking where the production set comes from. Most of the 
standard induced innovation models presume that successful R and D creates 
not just a new technique with a given input proportions and output 
attributes but a wide range of available new production choice options 
(e.g. labor is augmented at every possible capital-labor rates). In the 
language employed here this seems to presume that new techniques are explicit. 
They come out of R and D ready to use, and there is no need for fumbling 
trial and error in actual practice. Further, what comes out of R and D 
is a book of related techniques. The search models also presume an 
explicitness about the new techniques that come from R and D, in that 
no learning by doing seems required after "invention", but the invention 
is of a single technique not a book of them. Atkinson and Stiglitz, in 
their note, propose that technical change is local; in our language in 
their model an R and D project results in a single blueprint not a 
family of blueprints. If technical change is local, and past R and D 
is limited, then even if technological knowledge is explicit todays 
production set many be quite small. But if technological knowledge is 
tacit it is almost bound to be. Even if there are sets of blueprints 
for unused techniques, they are not usable without a lot of trial and 
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learning by doing. On the other hand with explicit articulated technical 
knowledge, if R and D results in packages of blueprints, prevailing 
production sets may have that textbook scope. 
In several of the models we have put together we have variables which 
determine the costs of trying to identify the technologies of other firms, 
the likelihood of identifying various other technologies, and the extent 
to which imitation when it is attempted results in a technique identical 
to or close to that employed by the imitated firm. The characterization 
of the degree of imitatability contained here strikes me as rather rich. 
The degree to which a technology is well understood might be modeled, 
within the above theoretical structure, in terms of the ability of a firm 
to point its research and development activity (search) reliably in one 
direction or another, in the sense that it can achieve with a reasonable 
degree of confidence what it tries to achieve at predicted cost. The neoclassical 
models employing in an innovation possibility frontier represent one extreme 
of understandability, some of our models where the firm has no ability to 
point research and development in one activity or another and the consequences 
of search amount to the results of a random draw represent the other extreme. 
The models under discussion clearly are a significant distance removed 
from grip on the details of firm behavior and innovation being explored in 
the empirical work of the research program on science and technology. They 
involve a drastic compression and simplification of what is going on at 
the level of the individual firm and of the.characteristics of the individual 
innovation and sequences of innovation. The advantage of this simplification 
and compression is that one can see the implications of the kind of behavior 
of firms built into the model at the level of the industry or the economy. 
And most economic analysis, as contrasted with organization analysis, or 
management consulting, proceeds at the level of the industry or the economy, 
not the individual firm. But the difficulties with the-'traditional theory 
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discussed above reveal sharply lie importance of understanding of what really 
is going on at the microscopic level. "As if" theorizing is a dangerous 
thing unless disciplined by such an understanding. 
At the more micro-cosmic lev^l, I propose that the ideas in behavioral 
models of firm actions (Cyert and March) are appropriate as building blocks. 
It is obvious that, in diliberating innovation and trying to solve problems, 
while firms may try to do as well as they can, they should not be viewed as 
maximizing over a well defined choice set with the implications of any choice 
well understood probabilistically. The firms in the Nelson-Winter models 
described above are "behavioral" in the sense that they follow rules of 
thumb and search for improvements in a manner that, while perhaps sensible, 
is not the result of any global optimizing calculations on their part. 
I suspect that the most fruitful modeling goal at the micro-cosmic level 
is not so much to understand the behavior of particular firms in considerable 
detail, but to understand better the character of the key processes involved 
in innovation. Clearly these are "problem solving" processes. While there 
has been some progress recently in modeling problem solving (see for example 
Newell and Simon) the models have tended to be of single person problems 
isolated in time - as a human being trying to play a winning game of chess. 
Two striking aspects of innovation, widely noted in the general empirical 
literature as well as in the studies under consideration here - are that it 
is a cumulative process with today's problems growing out of yesterday's 
solutions (like the moves in a chess game), and that it is a social 
process involving interaction among people and information flow. 
The connected nature of much of technical advance has been discussed by 
Rosenberg (on a big canvas) and Hollander (in a smaller frame). In a recent 
% 
paper of mine I have tried to formalize what is going on in the context of 
a model of search where what is found today provides part of the basis for 
devising ones search tomorrow. And here the question of how various things 
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are found or found out about clearly is crucial. Perhaps one can think of 
an R and D activity, on an activity studying another firm's technologies, 
as providing not explicit blueprints or new technical capabilities ready 
to use, but information and plausible hypotheses about what will work in 
practice, to guide changes in what a firm tries to do. In turn, experience 
in doing feeds back to influence the next round of the more separate and 
cognative learning processes. 
The fact that innovation .involves information flow among people and the 
marshalling of appropriate expertise is well recognized, but not adequately 
treated theoretically in any place that I know of. Many facets are involved. 
For one thing, externality and public goods aspects are involved in information 
generation. Economists have recognized this, but mainly in the context of 
treating a newly invented technique as explicit information. But to the 
extent that techniques tend to have significant tacit aspects and are 
4ifficult to teach and learn,the question of what are the public aspects 
of technical knowledge has to be seen as more complex than the simple 
"public technical knowledge" models presume. The question of how information 
flows, is sent and received, and mastered, become critical issues. This 
is what the technical transfer discussion is all about. But economists 
have hardly begun to model these aspects. 
V. Implications Regarding Thinking About Manufacturing Development 
Presume that much of manufacturing technology is characterized by a 
considerable element of tacitness, difficulties in imitation and teaching, 
and uncertainty regarding what modifications will work and what will not. 
What differences would this make, compared with the presumption of explicit-
ness, irritability, and predictable innovation, to thinking about manufacturing 
development? 
One implication is that the "technology choice" issue is much more complex 
and subtle than is implied by the orthodox discussion thereof. There doesn't 
exist a well defined set of "technological options" out there that a firm can 
scan and assess easily and reliably. This is not to deny that there isn't 
a wide range of choice, and that finding out about the options and thinking 
about the choices isn't important. However, it is likely to be a far more 
difficult matter than generally assumed for a firm to be able to judge how 
a particular technique employed by another firm would operate for it. 
Its own version of the technique invariably would involve a variety of 
idiosyncracies, some intended and some not. Invariably there would be 
teething problems, and a need to learn by doing, and perhaps by "researching". 
Second, neither the old fashioned Hecksher-Ohlin, nor the newer fangled 
"product cycle" theories of trade can adequately come to grips with evolving 
comparative advantage in less developed countries. This isn't to say that 
relative factor endowments don't matter, or that the most advanced countries 
don't have a broad economic advantage in industries where technical change is 
very rapid. But it is to say that manufacturing firms in countries not at the 
frontiers inevitably are going to be working with techniques that are different 
from, and not merely outdated versions of,the techniques used in the firms in 
« 
the countries at the technological frontiers. And they will be producing 
products of somewhat different character. These techniques and products may 
be better suited for purchase and use in countries-with comparable economic 
environments then those produced and used in the more advanced countries. And 
where this is so, it is highly likely that a certain amount of purposive 
innovation has gone on in the relevant company. 
Third, success in manufacturing development may depend to a very consider-
able extent on the creation and strengthening of an indigenous innovative 
capacity. I am not familiar with the details of what has been happening 
in manufacturing industry in those countries which have experienced the most 
striking success in manufacturing development over the last decade --
Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Mexico. I would conjecture strongly, however, that 
what has been happening can not be adequately explained merely in terms of 
growth of capital, and technology transfer. Rather, what has been happening 
has involved a considerable creativity. The case studies prepared under 
this project of the more successful firms reveal this sharply. 
Fourth, to the extent that this is so, inquiry needs to be redirected to 
the kinds of developmental questions that so concerned the classical economists, 
but which dropped out of attention with the ascendency of neoclassical formalism. 
There is a high premium to be placed on focusing theoretical attention on issues 
of innovation, entrepreneurship, dynamic competition and the role of education, 
banking institutions, and government policies more generally in these processes. 
It is not that serious scholars of the development process have not paid 
attention to these variables. But they have pa-id attention to them in an 
» 
atheoretical way. 
Indeed, it appears to me that there has been a growing gap between what 
sensible development economists know about development processes, and the 
theoretical structures available to give coherence and power to research. 
There is a strange notion that floats about among economists that theory 
should lead and empirical research should follow and test theory. This is 
much too asymmetric a view of fruitful relationship between theory and 
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empirical work. One of the really important accomplishments of this project 
may be that the phenomena that it is documenting so well will shock theorists 
into paying attention. 
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